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ABSTRACT
The IoT (Internet of Things) technology has been widely adopted
in recent years and has profoundly changed the people’s daily lives.
However, in the meantime, such a fast-growing technology has also
introduced new privacy issues, which need to be better understood
and measured.
In this work, we look into how private information can be leaked
from network traffic generated in the smart home network. Al-
though researchers have proposed techniques to infer IoT device
types or user behaviors under clean experiment setup, the effec-
tiveness of such approaches become questionable in the complex
but realistic network environment, where common techniques like
Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) and Virtual Private
Network (VPN) are enabled. Traffic analysis using traditional meth-
ods (e.g., through classical machine-learning models) is much less
effective under those settings, as the features picked manually are
not distinctive any more.
In this work, we propose a traffic analysis framework based on
sequence-learning techniques like LSTM and leveraged the tempo-
ral relations between packets for the attack of device identification.
We evaluated it under different environment settings (e.g., pure-IoT
and noisy environment with multiple non-IoT devices). The results
showed our framework was able to differentiate device types with
a high accuracy. This result suggests IoT network communications
pose prominent challenges to users’ privacy, even when they are
protected by encryption and morphed by the network gateway. As
such, new privacy protection methods on IoT traffic need to be
developed towards mitigating this new issue.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) have been gaining popularity increas-
ingly in recent years, and continue to expand in areas such as smart
homes, smart cities, industrial systems, connected health products,
and so on. According to reports from Forbes, the global IoT market
will grow from 157 billion US dollars in 2016 to 457 billion US dol-
lars by 2020, attaining a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
of 28.5% [1].
Smart home is a prominent use case of IoT, where multiple IoT
devices work together to facilitate all kinds of user activities by
sensing surroundings, interpreting human commands and provid-
ing feedback. However, smart home can introduce new threats
to residents’ privacy. Since network packets between IoT device
and remote server can be eavesdropped, a motivated attacker can
leverage such data to infer private information about the residents,
like what IoT devices are installed and whether they are active.
Leaking such information would cause grave consequences to the
residents: e.g., a theft can break into the home when no one is inside
by learning the status of the installed smart switch.
This paper aims to assess the privacy threat to smart home
residents by evaluating different traffic-analysis approaches on
datasets carrying real IoT traffic. Though a few recent works also
investigated the privacy issues related to IoT network communica-
tions [9, 11, 37], those works all assume a local adversary (only the
traffic between IoT device and gateway can be sniffed) or relatively
simple network environment (e.g., traffic from devices can be easily
separated). Whether traffic analysis is effective under a remote ad-
versary or more complex network is not yet assessed. In particular,
we assume that the the gateway may enable configurations that are
common but hamper traffic analysis, like Virtual Private Network
(VPN) and Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT). Under
those settings, traffic flows belonging to different IoT devices could
be merged to a single flow and the valuable information from fields
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like destination ports could be erased. Still, our study shows by
exploiting the temporal relations between packets of an individual
device, the device can be reliably identified.
More specifically, we found such temporal relations can be mod-
eled by sequence model LSTM-RNN when grouping consecutive
packets into a traffic window. We carefully designed the structure
of both models and evaluated on two datasets filled with traffic
generated from off-the-shelf IoT devices and non-IoT devices. The
evaluation results show our models can achieve better accuracy
comparing to the models widely used by existing works, like Ran-
dom Forest. To highlight a few, our bidirectional LSTM model can
achieve an accuracy of 99.2% and 97.7% on IoT devices in NAPT and
VPN configuration. Even when a large-amount of non-IoT traffic
are generated at the same time, it can still achieve 92.1% and 81.0%
accuracy in these two configurations.
Contributions.We summarize the technical contributions made
by this work as below.
(1) We present a traffic-analysis system, HomeMole, to automat-
ically infer the IoT devices behind a smart home network
even when traffic fusion like NAPT and VPN are enabled.
We designed a basic LSTM model and a bidirectional LSTM
model that are able to identify IoT devices based on the
sniffed packets.
(2) We evaluated our system under two network configurations
(NAPT and VPN) and two scenarios (pure-IoT and noisy
environment). The results indicate that our framework could
achieve high accuracy under those settings. Our models
outperform the baseline model, Random Forest, due to the
ability of modeling the temporal relations between packets.
To facilitate the research in this domain, we will release our
datasets, together with models we built. We believe by releasing
datasets and models, we could help other researchers to investigate
new traffic-analysis methods and IoT community to build better
defense.
Paper organization. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the background about the relevant previous work, smart
home network, our adversary model and neural networks used
in our paper. Section 3 describes the insights into IoT traffic, and
the design of our framework. Section 4 presents the experimental
results of our framework in different scenarios. Section 5 discusses
the limitations of this work. In the end, we conclude this study in
Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Related Work
Network traffic classification. Network traffic analysis has been
shown reasonably effective when applied on anomaly detection [25,
46], software identification [10, 33, 34], individual user fingerprint-
ing [43, 44] and etc. At a high level, the techniques used in existing
applications fall into the following two directions: deep packet
inspection and side-channel inference.
Deep packet inspection(DPI) is effective for packet classification
and intrusion detection when the network traffic is unencrypted.
Bujlow et al. [14] conducted a comparison among 6 well-known
DPI tools and found that the commercial DPI tool achieves very
good performance in traffic classification. However, DPI-based ap-
proaches become ineffective when it applied on encrypted traffic.
A lot of works have been proposed to analyze such traffic [13, 17,
27, 40, 45] by utilizing the side-channel information and metadata,
like source and destination IP address, port and packet size. Apart
from that, previous works like [38] also show other side-channel
information, such as wireless signal strength and timing, can be
leveraged to infer user activities. Machine learning based tech-
niques have shown many successes for traffic classifications. For
example, Taylor et al. [42] proposed an identification framework
for smartphone apps called AppScanner, which extracts statistical
features from network flows for classification tasks. Trained by
different learning algorithms, AppScanner can reach a highest ac-
curacy of 99.8% on 110 Apps. Chen et al. [15] proposed an online
traffic classification framework which utilizes kernel methods and
deep neural networks. They tested their tool on 5 different pro-
tocols and 5 mobile applications and achieved 99.84% and 88.43%
correspondingly. However, those two approaches only works on
relatively simple network environment where none of NAT or VPN
is enabled.
Traffic classification in IoT domain. Following the rapid devel-
opment of the IoT ecosystem, how to characterize and fingerprint
of IoT devices has become a trending topic. There have been some
works on IoT traffic analysis [11, 12, 29, 30, 35, 37] proposed in
recent years. Siby et al. [35] captured radio signals emitted from
IoT devices and created a system to store and visualize the traffic.
Recently, Apthorpe et al. [11] performed case studies on four IoT
devices, and show they exhibit distinctive traffic features, which
could enable device identification and behavior inference. Marcus
et al. [30] extracted 23 features from raw packets including network
protocols from Link layer to Application layer, IP options, IP ad-
dresses and ports. However, part of their features are inaccessible in
our settings due to the adversary capabilities and complex network
configurations (NAPT, VPN). For example, ARP and LLC are only
capturable in local area network environment, SSDP and MDNS
protocols account for only small amount of traffic that cannot holis-
tically describe the network status. Compared with them, our model
only takes advantage of 10 features extracted from packet metadata
which are illustrated elaborately in Section 3. Sivanathan et al. [37]
collected network traces of more than 20 IoT devices in a campus
environment over 3 weeks and characterized the profiles of those
IoT devices according to their traffic patterns. It also relies on an
extensive feature engineering to select the salient features and some
of them become vain when a complex network setting is applied,
like NAPT and VPN.
2.2 Smart Home Network
We assume the network communication within a smart home in-
volves four parties: IoT device, service provider, gateway and the
user. The communication schema is illustrated in Figure 1. Below
we briefly overview their communication schema.
• The first type of IoT device senses the surrounding environ-
ment and sends notifications to its associated listeners, either
periodically or immediately when the event takes place. For
example, Samsung ST Motion Sensor detects when a person
approaches in proximity [8] and notifies other IoT devices.
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Figure 1: Network structure of a typical smart home.
Another type of IoT device is IoT hub, which acts as the
“brain” (centroid controller) for other IoT devices (or IoT kits)
in the close range. IoT hub is necessary in order to control
IoT devices that use low-power protocols like BLE. Both
regular IoT device and IoT hub can be controlled by user’s
commands sent remotely or locally.
• The IoT device interacts with the service provider operated
by its manufacturer through Internet communications. The
service provider is responsible for request handling and re-
source relaying. To reduce the operational cost, many device
vendors have moved their services to the public cloud in-
frastructure and leverage the cloud analytics, like AWS IoT
Core [2], to process massive amount of IoT data.
• A gateway is a bridge between in-home IoT devices and the
remote service provider. A typical gateway (e.g., router) sup-
plies two types of interfaces for in-home devices, WLAN and
LAN. The communication with service provider is through
WAN interface.
• A user takes control of all smart devices in his/her home.
There are usually two ways to interact with IoT devices,
through mobile applications or human interactions (e.g.,
walking, talking, and touching).
Device identifier. IoT devices within the smart home network
can be distinguished by device identifiers determined by specific
network protocols. EachWi-Fi device has a unique source IP address
and MAC address. Though IoT kits might not get IP addresses
in smart home if they are not using WiFi, they can still obtain
identifiers from IoT hub through other protocols (e.g., NwkAddr for
Zigbee devices and Resolvable Private Address for BLE devices).
2.3 NAPT and VPN
When the network traffic is observed between the gateway and the
service provider, the original device identifiers may be obscured.
Firstly, the gateway could strip off the source MAC address from
the packets [3]. Even the port information can be changed under
NAPT (Network Address and Port Translation) or VPN (Virtual
Private Network). Below, we describe how changes are made by
NAPT and VPN.
NAPT. To conserve the limited global IPv4 space, NAPT is devel-
oped to enable the sharing of one IP address among different devices.
In particular, NAPT modifies the network-layer and transport-layer
Figure 2: VPN-enabled gateway.
identifiers like destination IP address and destination port numbers
of inbound packets[39]. For outbound packets, the source IP address
and the source port are translated. In both cases, the IP address of a
local device is replaced with the gateway’s IP address. The gateway
using NAPT holds a translation table which records the mapping
of addresses and ports so that packets will be routed to the right
destination.
VPN. VPNs are often used to interconnect different networks to
form a new network with a larger capacity [19]. Based on the IP
tunneling mechanism, hosts in different subnets can communicate
with each other and the delivered information can be kept secret
with authentication and encryption. Figure 2 shows the network
structure after deploying a VPN-enabled gateway. Different from
normal routers, a VPN-enabled gateway owns three network in-
terfaces – wlan0, eth0 and tun0. Among them, wlan0 works as
the entrance of LAN, collecting and delivering packets from local
devices. The Ethernet interface eth0 holds the connection between
the gateway and WAN. tun0 is created by VPN client process. For
every packet from wlan0 to eth0, the VPN client first encrypts the
original packet into a payload and constructs a new packet. The new
packet is then delivered to a VPN server and gets decrypted. The
VPN server then forwards restored packets to their original destina-
tions. From the viewpoint of destination remote server, the original
metadata like source IP and source port are completely hidden,
which protects user’s privacy against on-path eavesdroppers.
2.4 Adversary Model
The goal of our adversary is to identify the active IoT devices in
the targeted smart home. Such inference can leak sensitive infor-
mation in a smart home. For example, an ISP can infer the device
information and sell them to advertisers who like to do targeted
advertising. Or a theft can pick the time when the user is not at
home by sniffing the outbound traffic and inferring the status of the
installed surveillance camera. To this end, in this paper we consider
passive eavesdroppers who can observe the encrypted network
traffic flowing between the gateway and the remote service. More
importantly, there are two realistic settings that are not considered
by prior works. On one hand, we assume that NAPTs or VPNs are
enabled in the gateway so that the original device identifiers are
replaced by the gateway’s and the traffic belonging to different de-
vices aremerged, even the contacted remote server becomes opaque
to the adversary. On the other hand, we assume multiple devices
(including IoT devices and non-IoT devices such as mobile phones
and tablets) may work simultaneously such that their packets are
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Figure 3: Structure of a basic LSTM used in our work (FC
means fully-connected layer).
interleaving. As shown in [37], non-IoT devices usually have a
higher rate in generating packets and their volume is larger than
that of IoT devices, which means the existence of non-IoT devices
can significantly distort the original statistical features learned on
IoT devices.
Previous works [9, 12, 42] assumed that the adversary can sniff
traffic within the smart home network (i.e., local adversary) or
traffic fusion is not performed by the gateway. In their scenarios,
the flows from different devices are clearly separated based on
device identifiers. Unlike previous works, the remote adversary in
our study is more realistic and the traffic analysis is much more
challenging to perform.
2.5 LSTM-RNN
Recently, deep neural network (DNN) has been gaining traction
in the security domain and shown many promising results, given
its capability of feature representation learning. For example, the
research of Rimmer et al. demonstrated that websites visited by Tor
users can be fingerprinted automatically with DNN [34].
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is one type of DNN that is
good at handling temporal-related sequences. With multiple recur-
rent cells connected, the output of a previous cell can be passed
to the current one. In this way, historical information is kept and
forwarded. Among different implementations of RNN, LSTM(Long
Short-Term Memory)-RNN has become a popular choice as it is
able to address weakness of other RNNs like exploding and vanish-
ing gradient. It provides a novel memory cell consisting of three
different gates: input gate, forget gate and output gate. These gates
are used to process the data transferred from previous memory
cell and manipulate the current cell state. LSTM-RNN has achieved
many successes in different areas, such as speech recognition [21],
medical diagnose [28] and system log analysis [16]. Figure 3 shows
the structure of a basic LSTM-RNN.
Inspired by the recent research, we find our problem is a natural
fit for LSTM-RNN models. Similar to system logs, traffic generated
by IoT devices can be organized in chronological order. There exists
contextual dependency between packets based on the running states
of the device and such dependency can be modeled by LSTM-RMM
models. In Section 3, we describe our LSTM-RNN models in details.
2.6 Adversary Model
The goal of our adversary is to identify the active IoT devices in
the targeted smart home. Such inference can leak sensitive infor-
mation in a smart home. For example, an ISP can infer the device
information and sell them to advertisers who like to do targeted
advertising. Or a theft can pick the time when the user is not at
home by sniffing the outbound traffic and inferring the status of the
installed surveillance camera. To this end, in this paper we consider
passive eavesdroppers who can observe the encrypted network
traffic flowing between the gateway and the remote service. More
importantly, there are two realistic settings that are not considered
by prior works. On one hand, we assume that NAPTs or VPNs are
enabled in the gateway so that the original device identifiers are
replaced by the gateway’s and the traffic belonging to different de-
vices aremerged, even the contacted remote server becomes opaque
to the adversary. On the other hand, we assume multiple devices
(including IoT devices and non-IoT devices such as mobile phones
and tablets) may work simultaneously such that their packets are
interleaving. As shown in [37], non-IoT devices usually have a
higher rate in generating packets and their volume is larger than
that of IoT devices, which means the existence of non-IoT devices
can significantly distort the original statistical features learned on
IoT devices.
Previous works [9, 12, 42] assumed that the adversary can sniff
traffic within the smart home network (i.e., local adversary) or
traffic fusion is not performed by the gateway. In their scenarios,
the flows from different devices are clearly separated based on
device identifiers. Unlike previous works, the remote adversary in
our study is more realistic and the traffic analysis is much more
challenging to perform.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we elaborate the design and implementation of our
system, named HomeMole, for fingerprinting IoT traffic. The goal
is to identify the active IoT devices in a smart-home environment
based on their network traffic. Different from those doing finger-
printing at flow level[15, 42], HomeMoleworks at packet level, which
means all the packets will be given a label after processed by our
models. As such, HomeMole is able to work in online mode and give
prompt results. In addition to device identification, HomeMole can
also be used for other scenarios like QoS (Quantity of Service) and
IDS (Intrusion Detection System), as shown in [18, 32].
Below, we first describe our insights into IoT traffic analysis in
Section 3.1. Next, we elaborate how we set up the environment to
collect data in Section 3.2. After that, we explain how we prepare
datasets from raw collected packets in Section 3.3. Finally, we show
the detailed structure of our models and why they are adequate for
smart-home environment in Section 3.4.
3.1 Insights into IoT traffic
We carried out exploratory analysis on the realworld IoT devices
and public dataset to characterize their network communication
patterns. We identify several insights which highlight the unique-
ness of IoT traffic comparing to the desktop and mobile traffic.
1) The devices belong to the same category have similar traffic patterns.
As one example, we show the traffic patterns of Amazon Echo Dot
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Device (%) IPv4 UDP TCP TLS HTTP DNS O
Google Home 100.0 1.5 98.1 26.6 0 0.6 0.4
Echo Dot 100.0 ∼0 ∼100.0 14.6 ∼0 ∼0 ∼0
Tmall Assist 99.6 0 99.6 21.0 5.5 ∼0 0.4
360 Cam
(LAN mode) 99.7 78.6 21.1 0.4 0 0 0.4
360 Cam
(WAN mode) 100.0 99.9 0.1 ∼0 0 0 0
Orvibo 99.6 0.2 99.4 ∼0 0 0 0.4
Broadlink 99.7 99.7 0 0 0 0 0.3
Tplink 99.4 0.1 99.3 50.9 0 0 0.6
Xiaomi Hub 99.5 99.5 0 0 0 0 0.5
Noise - mobile 87.6 5.5 80.1 4.5 1.7 2.2 12.4
Noise - tablet 87.0 0.5 86.4 0.6 0.1 0.1 13.0
Table 1: Protocol distribution (O means other protocols).
and Google Voice Assistant (both are voice assistants) when they
are waken up (see Figure 11 and Figure 12 in Appendix A). As can be
seen, when the voice command is recognized, both of them generate
a traffic burst, followed by a period of continuous communication
with the remote server.
2) Heartbeat communication is prevalent. The service provider relies
on the heartbeat messages sent by the IoT device to acquire liveness
of the device. The heartbeat packets usually have constant size
and interval, and different devices tend to use different modes for
heartbeat. For example, Amazon Echo Dot sends a 95-byte heartbeat
packet in TLSv1.2 format every 30 seconds, and Google Home
sends two consecutive heartbeat packets in TLSv1.2 format every
60 seconds with the size of 135 bytes and 104 bytes. In addition,
heartbeat communications are rarely disturbed by other activities
happening on the devices. As such, they are good indicators to
distinguish the categories or even manufacturers.
3) Protocol choices are diverse. The communication between devices
and remote services must follow certain convention, which is re-
flected in the chosen protocols. In Table 1 we show such diversified
choices in terms of packets ratio under different network protocols.
Note that we only measure protocols at network layer, transmis-
sion layer and application layer, discarding those from lower layers.
According to our statistics, most traffic captured by an attacker is
IPv4-based. For devices with large volumes of traffic, like network
camera, UDP is usually adopted. Compared with non-IoT devices,
IoT devices generate much less HTTP traffic for communication.
Though DNS is usually used by previous works for device identifica-
tion [11, 12, 37], our results show that its ratio is quite low compared
to other protocols. As such, simply relying on DNS does not guaran-
tee device identification especially when the traffic observed comes
from an incomplete session.
In short, the above observations suggest fingerprinting IoT de-
vices is feasible, even under complex network environment like
NAPT and VPN. On the other hand, a comprehensive model instead
of matching individual feature is necessary for our task.
3.2 Data Collection
While some prior works on IoT network analsyis have published
their datasets [37]. We found they cannot be used in our study, as
we focus on more complex settings with NAPT and VPN enabled in
the gateway. As such, we set up our own smart home environment
and collected the traffic by ourselves. The dataset will be published
at a public repository.
We set up the environment in a campus laboratory with 15 de-
vices, including 10 IoT and 4 non-IoT devices. Table 2 shows the
details of our devices. Our devices can be divided into six categories:
voice assistant, IoT hub, IoT kits(smart plug), network camera, in-
teractive machine and non-IoT deivces. Devices used in our paper
have different interaction modes and traffic patterns, which can be
helpful to depict the overall picture of IoT device traffic.
We use a Raspberry Pi [7] as the gateway. A typical Raspberry Pi
provides two network interface cards – eth0 and wlan0. To simulate
NAPT, we connect eth0 to the Internet and then enable the linux
service hostapd to create an access point with wlan0 network card
of Raspberry Pi. Next, we create rules for iptables so that packets
can be forwarded from wlan0 to eth0 and vice versa. For VPN, we
establish a virtual machine with DigitalOcean Droplets service [4]
and use it as our VPN server, we then setup openvpn client on our
Raspberry Pi to enable VPN tunneling.
device MAC type
echo dot 88:71:e5:ed:be:c7 voice assistant
google home f4:f5:d8:db:61:84 voice assistant
tmall assist 18:bc:5a:19:eb:7d voice assistant
xiaomi hub 78:11:dc:e1:f0:6b hub
360 camera b0:59:47:34:16:ff network camera
xiaobai camera 78:11:dc:cf:c8:f1 network camera
tplink plug 30:20:10:fb:7c:05 smart plug
orvibo plug b4:e6:2d:08:63:0c smart plug
broadlink plug 78:0f:77:1b:00:8c smart plug
mitu story teller 28:6c:07:87:54:b0 interactive
xiaomi mobile a4:50:46:06:80:43 non-IoT
xiaomi tablet 20:a6:0c:5a:42:10 non-IoT
sony mobile 28:3f:69:05:2d:b0 non-IoT
motorola mobile 44:80:eb:21:cb:95 non-IoT
Table 2: Devices used in our experiment
We collect network traffic under three different settings:
• Single-device environment. We assume only one device is
active and we connect one IoT device to the gateway at a
time.
• Multi-device and noisy environment. In this case, all IoT and
non-IoT devices are connected to the gateway which has
NAPT enabled. Several devices may work simultaneously at
time, leading to traffic fusion.
• VPN environment. In addition to the above settings, we as-
sume VPN is enabled. Traffic before and after VPN are both
collected from wlan0 and eth0 at the same time.
To generate traffic, we adopt two strategies: automatic triggering
and manual triggering. Automation can relieve the burden of te-
dious repeating experimenters and manual triggering can simulate
human-machine interaction in real environments.
Automatic triggering. For devices like smart plug and network
that can be controlled by mobile apps, we use MonkeyRunner [5] to
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Figure 4: Proportion of collected packets.
interact with the UI of mobile apps and trigger different functions of
IoT devices. For devices like voice assistants directly controlled by
human’s input, we replay the commands near them. For example,
Google Home plays songs when it hears the command “sing a
song”. We record a list of different commands and play them in a
loop with a proper interval. As smart devices may have different
responses even facing the same command, though the total amount
of recorded commands is fixed, traffic we collect may vary.
Manual triggering. The Manual triggering is used in collecting
traffic from multi-device scenario. In this setting, devices are set up
in a shared room (laboratory), people coming in and out this room
can interact with the devices as they want. The functions triggered
in this scenario and their time intervals are irregular and comply
with what may happen in a real environment. Compared with the
automatic triggering approach, manual triggering introduces more
randomness to the dataset, which is helpful to the generalization
of our models.
We adopt the popular network analysis tool tshark to monitor
wlan0 and eth0 simultaneously. The traffic collected is dumped
into files with extension “.pcapng” and is then pre-processed before
classification.
The collection lasts for 49.4 hours. In a total, we collected 4.05 GB
traffic with 7,223,282 available packets (those cannot be obtained by
our adversary model are excluded, like packets only being transmit-
ted inside the LAN). The distribution of packets is shown in Fig 4.
Note that, due to the internal functionalities of devices vary and
users’ different habits, the collected traffic does not comply with a
uniform distribution.
3.3 Traffic Pre-processing
Weutilize amulti-platform packet parsing framework called PcapPlus
Plus to pre-process the traffic. The goal is to extract low-level but
useful features from the packet and compose a numerical vector
that can be processed by our models.
Feature selection. Due to the encryption enforced by the commu-
nication, we extract features from the metadata of packet headers.
We select features from different layers – frame length and epoch
time from physical layer, and destination port number from
transport layer. In addition, we use a binary sequence to repre-
sent the protocols in packet transmission. We select 6 most common
protocol types including IP, TCP, UDP, TLS/SSL, HTTP and DNS, ac-
cording to our measurement (see Table 1). If a packet involves one
of the protocols, the corresponding bit will be set to 1, otherwise
0. We set the last position of the ‘binary string’ to be others for
the protocols beyond the previous 6 protocols. For example, a UDP-
based DNS request is represented as <1010010> and a NTP packet
is represented as <1010001>. The only feature we consider beyond
metadata is the direction of packet. We use 0 and 1 for inbound
and outbound packets respectively.
Note that we do not use the domain name in DNS response
like previous works [11, 12] because DNS can be encrypted as
well [23, 24]. The destination IP is not used because it is periodically
changed when the IoT vendors run the remote server on public
cloud, which has become a popular choice [2].
In the end, we concatenate all the selected features and compose
a one-dimensional vector as the representation of a packet (<dport,
protocol, direction, frame length, time interval>), as
shown in Figure 5. Note that we compute time interval from the
epoch time between two adjacent packets and use it as feature to
model the temporal relations between packets.
Packet labeling. One key challenge in traffic pre-processing is
packet labeling, especially under VPN environment. As section 2.3
shows, packets collected outside of smart home (or between eth0
and VPN server) are all merged into a single flow (packets with the
same destination IP and port [42]), without any original identifier
of sender/receiver. To identify the VPN packets and label those with
their corresponding devices, we develop a mapping technique based
on three observations obtained through our empirical analysis: (1)
The size of a packet increases after being processed by VPN; (2)
Multiple packets with different sizes can have the same size after
the encryption performed by VPN; (3) There is a delay of packet
transmission caused by VPN, which is usually shorter than 0.02
second.
Observation (1) and (2) can be reasoned through the cryptogra-
phy algorithms used by openvpn server. It provides three symmetric
encryption algorithms – BF-CBC, AES-128-CBC and DES-EDE3-
CBC. All of them are block ciphers through which encryption in-
creases the size of packets. Observation (3) helps us reduce the
scope for linking packets before and after VPN. As a result, for
each VPN-processed packet with timestamp t , we first check its
direction. If it is inbound, we search its counterpart with smaller
packet size in the time window (t , t + 0.02]. If it is outbound, the
time window becomes [t − 0.02, t). We measure the effectiveness
of our algorithm by counting the rate of successfully pairing and
the overall accuracy is 98.8%.
3.4 Models
In this section, we first describe the baseline model we use for
comparison and then describe our customized LSTM-RNN model.
3.4.1 Baseline Model. We consider random forest as our baseline
model as it has been widely-used in previous works on device
fingerprinting [9, 37, 42]. A typical random forest is comprised
of multiple single decision trees. During the training phase, inner
decision trees are trained with different parts of the dataset and a
final result is given based on the voting of those separate trees. In
our work, we train a random forest model with the labeled packet
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54087 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.384 0
443 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.967 0.5e-2
54087 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.384 2.3e-4
53 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.684 5.1e-3
dport protocol packet 
size 
time
interval
… ...
packet 0
packet 1
packet 2
packet n
0
1
0
1
dir
Figure 5: An example of traffic window.
Embedding
dimension
LSTM hidden
dimension
LSTM
layer
Dropout
rate
30 64 1 0.5
Learning
rate
Activation
function Optimizer
Training
epochs
0.001 ReLU Adam 15
Table 3: Parameters of a LSTM-RNN model.
vectors and the model predicts the device associated with each
packet of testing dataset.
Among all the 5 features, dport needs to be processed before
being used by the baseline model, since it is a discrete value with
wide range (0∼65536) that cannot be directly learned by a machine-
learning model. We first encode dport value into a one-hot binary
string. Since most of the ports are rarely used, we use principal
component analysis (PCA) to select 50 principal components from
the string. The total variance of them is around 98.9% according
to our statistics, which means the 50 components keep most of
information involved in ports.
For the hyper-parameters of Random Forest, we set the number
of individual trees to 100 to balance training speed and performance.
3.4.2 LSTM-RNN Model. In Section 2.5, we overview the LSTM-
RNN and describe its advantage when being used to solve our
problem. Below we describe the construction of our LSTM-based
models, including a basic version and a bidirectional version.
Traffic window. After pre-processing, each packet is transformed
into a feature vector. We then group n consecutive vectors to form
a traffic window. Figure 5 shows an example of a traffic window.
With traffic windows, we are able to model the temporal relations of
adjacent packets. We show the impact of window size on evaluation
result in Section 4.2.2.
Basic LSTM. A basic version contains multiple blocks and each
block contains 4 layers:
-Embedding layer. Embedding has been widely-used in the do-
main of Natural Language Processing(NLP) [31, 41] which trans-
forms discrete values into continuous vectors. In our LSTM models,
we transform dport information into embeddings instead of the
one-hot encoding like baseline model, mainly because this embed-
ding layer can be seamless connetcted to other layers. In addition,
it is a dynamic “mini” neural network gradually updating during
the training phase. Therefore, our training data can optimize this
representation.
LSTM
block
LSTM
block
LSTM
block
LSTM
block
LSTM
block
LSTM
block
concat
…...
…...
…...
concat concat
FC FC FC…...
softmax …...softmax softmax
Inputs
…...
Embedding
layer
Embedding
layer
Embedding
layer
Figure 6: Structure of the bidirectional LSTM used in our
work.
-LSTM layer. After the processing of embedding layer, the input
will be fed into the LSTM layer. At each step, a packet is assigned to
a LSTM cell. The output of LSTM cells can be stacked into a matrix
as input of the next layer.
-Fully-connected layer.We put a hidden fully-connected layer
between LSTM layer and softmax layer with the size equal to the
number of total categories.
-Softmax layer. The hidden dense layer output is then fed into
the softmax layer for normalization. The output of softmax layer is
the probability distribution indicating how likely a sample belongs
to a category, which sums to one. For our task of multi-class classi-
fication, we select the category with the highest probability as the
final output.
Bidirectional LSTM. The basic LSTM model only looks into the
“past” of a packet when learning contextual information. Bidirec-
tional LSTM (BLSTM) is an extension to the basic LSTM, which
utilizes the information from “future”, by combining another LSTM
layer moving from the end of a sequence to its beginning [20]. In
areas like phoneme classification [22] and sequence tagging [26],
BLSTM significantly improves the performance compared to a tra-
ditional one. Since our model works on a traffic window which
consists of multiple adjacent packets, we can utilize the informa-
tion of the packets transmitted after the current packet to classify
it. The main change we apply on the LSTM layer is to concatenate
cell states of backward and forward LSTM layers and feed them to
the dense layer. Figure 6 shows the structure of the bidirectional
LSTM used in our work.
4 EVALUATION
In the evaluation, we want to understand how our models perform
under different network scenarios. In this section, we first introduce
the datasets we used for evaluation and our evaluation metrics.
Then we describe our three scenes and the corresponding results.
Finally we show several case studies.
As a quick overview of our results, we found LSTM-RNN models
can well handle packet identification tasks with an overall accu-
racy over 92.0% in NAPT and VPN configurations on IoT traffic.
Compared to basic LSTM, bidirectional LSTM performs better, sug-
gesting the packet dependency indeed reveals the patterns unique
to each individual IoT device.
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Figure 7: Proportion of device combinations. (geq: greater
than or equal to 7)
4.1 Experiment Settings
Scenarios. We evaluate HomeMole in two scenarios – pure-IoT
(only one active IoT device) and noisy (multiple active IoT and
non-IoT devices). In each scenario, we evaluate HomeMole with two
different gateway configurations – NAPT and VPN.
Datasets.We constructed two datasets for the two scenarios. Each
dataset has an NAPT version and a VPN version. We split each
dataset with the training and testing ratio of 8:2 and conduct 5-fold
cross-validation on it. Below are the details of each dataset.
(1) Dataset-Ind. This dataset contains traffic representations
from 10 individual IoT devices. To facilitate the training pro-
cess of LSTM-RNN models, the dataset is organized into col-
lections of trafficwindows, each trafficwindow only contains
packets from one certain device. To make the dataset
more balanced, we set a number threshold 5,000 for each
device. All IoT devices own 5,000 randomly-selected samples
except Xiaomi hub, tplink plug, orvibo plug and broadlink
plug, due to that they generate much fewer packets than oth-
ers. In total, Dataset-Ind contains 32,760 traffic windows.
(2) Dataset-Noise. This dataset is collected by keeping multi-
ple devices active in the same time period. As a result, the
traffic windows in this dataset are composed of packets from
more than one devices. In total, Dataset-Noise includes
114,989 traffic windows. Figure 7 shows the distribution of
device combinations. From it we can see, 2-device and 3-
device combinations are most common.
Metrics. Since HomeMole is able to classify individual packets, we
measure the effectiveness of HomeMole based on the probability
that the device is correctly identified per packet. We use overall
accuracy (similar to [36]) and category accuracy for our case. For
overall accuracy, we count N as all the packets and Pcorrect as the
total number of correctly classified packets, and compute PcorrectN .
For category accuracy, we assess how HomeMole performs on each
device. For deviceA, we count NA as all packets belonging toA and
PAcorrect as A’s packets correctly classified under A. The category
accuracy for A is PAcorrectNA . As an example, the diagonal cells on
the confusion matrix shown in Figure 13 describe the category
accuracy.
4.2 Pure-IoT Scenario
In this setting, there is only one active IoT device working during a
period of time. Therefore, we assess how HomeMole performs when
traffic is not merged. In practice, such scenario happens when the
rest IoT devices enter hibernation mode.
4.2.1 Baseline Model. We first evaluate the performance of our
baseline model, Random Forest. In this scenario, The purposes are
two-fold: (1) To explore the feasibility of classifying individual
packet without context; (2) To evaluate the effectiveness of features
we selected from packet’s metadata.
Experimental results. Table 4 shows the accuracy of random for-
est in NAPT and VPN configuration. As can be seen, with NAPT
configuration, the random forest can reach a high identification
accuracy on most IoT devices. Among them, smart plugs and net-
work cameras have the highest accuracy while voice assistants
have a lower accuracy ∼ 87%. Compared with NAPT, random forest
performs worse in VPN configuration with a 9.0% decline in overall
accuracy. Accuracy on voice assistant is affected most.
Result analysis.We first use the built-in API provided by scikit-
learn library to obtain feature importance. The results show that in
NAPT, dport, frame length, time interval and protocol hold
an importance factor of 55.5%, 22.8%, 12.8% and 8.0% separately.
In VPN, frame length and time interval take up around 54.9%
and 43.0% separately.
Compared with NAPT configuration, the obvious decline in VPN
mainly comes from the change of dport and protocol (dport
and protocol information is not preserved in the packet between
gateway and VPN server) and partial loss of frame length due to
padding by VPN client.
4.2.2 LSTM-RNN Models. We conjecture that the dependency of
packets can be used for device identification, and we model it
through LSTM-RNN models. Below we evaluate the two proposed
LSTM-RNN models on Dataset-Ind.
Experimental results. Table 4 also shows performance of basic
LSTM and bidirectional LSTM when the input traffic window
contains 100 consecutive packets. We can see that compared to the
baseline, both of the models have seen increase of accuracy on most
devices. The result also shows LSTM-RNN models can well handle
IoT devices producing large volume of traffic like voice assistant.
Impact of trafficwindow size.We compare the accuracy of LSTM-
RNN models with different window sizes: 20, 40 and 100. The result
is shown in Figure 8. From it we can see for both NAPT and VPN
configurations, LSTM-RNN models perform better when the traf-
fic window size grows. This result indicates the relation between
packets with long timing gap can still provide useful information
for our models. In the following sections, we take 100 as the default
size of our traffic window.
4.3 Noisy Scenario
In this section, we evaluate the impact of non-IoT device traffic on
our task.
4.3.1 BaselineModel. Wefirst tested RandomForest using Dataset-
Noise to understand the impact of non-IoT traffic and traffic fusion.
Given the different traffic volume among devices, the packets we
collect are imbalanced, as Figure 4 shows.
Your Smart Home Can’t Keep a Secret:
Towards Automated Fingerprinting of IoT Traffic with Neural Networks Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
config model average echodot
google
home
tmall
assistant
xiaomi
hub
360
cam
tplink
plug
orvibo
plug
mitu
story
xiaobai
camera
broadlink
plug
NAPT
RF 92.2 89.0 85.9 86.9 89.6 99.0 99.9 99.9 93.3 98.5 99.3
LSTM 97.3 98.5 91.6 93.9 98.6 99.9 99.9 99.9 98.7 99.9 99.9
BLSTM 99.2 97.0 99.2 99.8 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.3 99.9 99.9
VPN
RF 83.2 76.1 81.2 74.7 94.0 83.2 89.1 93.1 87.5 90.5 99.0
LSTM 92.4 89.7 89.7 75.4 96.1 95.9 92.2 95.5 96.8 94.7 95.7
BLSTM 97.7 96.6 96.8 94.7 99.4 98.5 98.0 99.5 98.9 99.7 96.7
Table 4: Accuracy of baseline model under pure-IoT scenario
(RF, LSTM and BLSTM stand for random forest, basic LSTM and bidirectional LSTM respectively).
Figure 8: The impact of traffic window size (pure-IoT).
Experimental results. Compared with pure-IoT scenario, Ran-
dom Forest has a prominent decline in the overall accuracy, reach-
ing 84.5% in NAPT and 67.6% in VPN. We also use confusion
matrix across devices to show the classification results by cate-
gory with non-IoT traffic in NAPT and VPN configuration (see
Figure 13 and Figure 14 in Appendix B). From them we can see,
voice assistants, like Echo Dot, Google Home and Tmall Assis-
tant, see larger performance drop compared to other IoTs, with a
∼ 25% decline in NAPT and a ∼ 50% decline in VPN configurations.
Result analysis. We manually check the mis-classified packets
and find that most of them are transmitted through ports 443 and
80. The primary reason is that those ports are likely to be used by
different IoT and non-Iot at the same time, so our model is more
likely to be confused.
4.3.2 LSTM-RNN Models. Experimental results. Figure 9 and
Figure 10 give the comparison results between three models in
NAPT and VPN configurations. The last group of columns (“aver-
age”) shows the overall accuracy. Bidirectional LSTM achieves the
highest accuracy of 92.1% in NAPT and 81.0% in VPN. Basic LSTM
reaches 87.1% and 74.1%. Figure 15 and Figure 16 of Appendix A
show the concrete classification results of bidirectional LSTM by
device categories in two configurations. From them we know: (1)
LSTM-RNNmodels are good at recognizing traffic in NAPT configu-
ration; (2) LSTM-RNN performs much worse in VPN configuration,
especially on IoT devices like smart plugs (BLSTM: 12.6% for Orvibo,
20.4% for Tplink and 15.9% for Broadlink in 5 cross validations).
Result analysis. From the above results we can see LSTM-RNN
models fail to classify traffic generated by smart plugs in VPN con-
figuration. We find this observation can be ascribed to the sparse
traffic generated by the devices. Due to the relative long time in-
tervals between packets and the low packet amount, the traffic
Figure 9: Performances of three models in NAPT environ-
ment.
Figure 10: Performances of three models in VPN environ-
ment.
generated by smart plugs can be easily “overwhelmed” by traffic
from others, leading to the original relation between packets being
impaired. In extreme cases, packets generated by smart plugs can
be “diluted” to less than 3% in a traffic window (3 in 100 packets).
The situation becomes worse when distinctive features like dport
and frame length are more likely to be confused. In Section 4.4
we show a case of orvibo plug.
4.4 Case Studies
Scarce traffic. Several IoT devices have a low traffic volume, such as
orvibo plug and tplink plug. Therefore, the packets generated
by them may be “overwhelmed” by other devices in the same traffic
window. Take orvibo plug as an example. It has a three-TCP-
packet sequence appearing multiple times. Their frame lengths
are 224, 54, 240 bytes in two seconds correspondingly. But those
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numbers are not unique. According to our analysis, packets with
the same sizes are generated by other devices so our classification
models could be confused. In particular, 360 camera produces
UDP packet of 224 bytes very frequently. xiaomi hub and xiaomi
tablet generate TCP packets of 54 bytes consistently at high speed
(15 packets in 0.1 second). As such, the three consecutive packets of
orvibo plug are likely to be separated by those packets from other
devices, leading to wrong classification results, especially in VPN
configuration when protocol information is missing. This could
explain why LSTM-RNN models perform worse in identifying IoT
devices of small traffic volume in VPN environment.
Effectiveness of bidirectional LSTM. Section 4 shows the accu-
racy of bidir LSTM model is better than the basic LSTM model in
most cases. Below we use one example to explain this performance
difference. Through our manual check of traffic from different de-
vices, we find packets of the size 66 bytes are commonly sent to
the server in a sequence by Echo Dot and Google Home. However,
the responses from the server are different between two devices.
For Echo Dot, most of the responses are of a size 1388 bytes while
for Google Home, most of them are TLS packets with the size of
108 bytes and 105 bytes. Compared to a basic LSTM, a bidirectional
LSTM can utilize the later packet (1388-byte or 105-byte) to help
classify the previous packets (66-byte). As such, adding the informa-
tion from “future” could improve the chance of correctly classifying
packets.
5 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATION
Packet-level identification. Different from previous work that
identifies devices based on network flows or traffic windows, we
assign the device label to every packet generated within a period.
The motivation for doing packet-level classification is that the run-
ning status of IoT devices can be more accurately identified and the
device information can be obtained more promptly. For example, if
packets are observed sparsely, the device might be in sleeping or
standby mode. Otherwise, a dense packet sequence indicates the
device is busy running a task. This is critical in some cases like
camera monitoring, if a thief knows when a network camera is
transmitting bulk data, he can infer whether the host is monitoring
the house and decide the best time to sneak into the house. Ad-
ditionally, we can combine the predicted labels of all packets in a
time window to make better inference of IoT devices.
VPN connections. During the experiment, we only establish our
VPN connection using UDP protocols. Another option – TCP(TLS)
is not tested. The main reason is that UDP is the default protocol
adopted by the openVPN service and is the most-widely protocol
used by VPN providers due to its low latency [6] compared with
TCP. VPN using TCP requires modification of our packet labeling
algorithm in Section 3.3 and we decide to leave it as our future
work.
Behavior identification.We focused on device identification dur-
ing evaluation, while previous works also explored user behavior
identification [9]. We did not experiment with behavior identifi-
cation because the labeling cost is high given that we have large
datasets with millions of IoT packets. On the other hand, we believe
our models can be applied to this scenario if we have enough train-
ing samples. We will explore approaches that can generate labeled
behavioral datasets efficiently.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we systematically evaluated the effectiveness of traffic
analysis in a smart home environment, even when traffic fusion
like NAPT and VPN are enabled and non-IoT and IoT devices are
both active. By exploiting the dependency between packets through
DNNmodels like LSTM-RNN, we show it is possible to achieve high
accuracy in device identification, even under the complex network
environment as described above.
Our result suggests the network communications of IoT devices
do have serious privacy implications, even under encryption and
traffic fusion. We believe more research should be done to better
understand the privacy issues in smart home network and mitigate
such issues. To facilitate the research in this domain, we will release
the data and our models.
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Appendix A TRAFFIC PATTERNS OF IOT
DEVICES
Figure 11 and figure 12 show the traffic patterns when waking Echo
Dot and Google Home up.
Appendix B PERFORMANCE IN NOISY
ENVIRONMENT
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the performance of random forest in
NAPT and VPN configurations in noisy environment. Figure 15 and
Figure 16 show the performance of bidirectional LSTM in NAPT
and VPN configurations within noisy environment.
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Figure 11: Echo dot. Figure 12: Google Voice Assistant
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Figure 13: Confusion matrix of RF (noisy+NAPT).
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Figure 14: Confusion matrix of RF (noisy+VPN).
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Figure 15: Confusion matrix of BLSTM (noisy+NAPT).
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Figure 16: Confusion matrix of BLSTM (noisy+VPN).
